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Abstract 
Are we any closer to creating an autonomous model of 
analogical reasoning that can generate new and creative 
analogical comparisons? A three-phase model of ana-
logical reasoning is presented that encompasses the 
phases of retrieval, mapping and inference validation. 
The model of the retrieval phase maximizes its creativ-
ity by focusing on domain topology, combating the se-
mantic locality suffered by other models. The mapping 
model builds on a standard model of the mapping 
phase, again making use of domain topology. A novel 
validation model helps ensure the quality of the infer-
ences that are accepted by the model. We evaluated the 
ability of our tri-phase model to re-discover several h-
creative analogies (Boden, 1992) from a background 
memory containing many potential source domains. 
The model successfully re-discovered all creative com-
parisons, even when given problem descriptions that 
more accurately reflect the original problem – rather 
than the standard (post hoc) representation of the anal-
ogy. Finally, some remaining challenges for a truly 
autonomous creative analogy machine are assessed. 
Introduction 
Analogy has a long and illustrious history within creativity, 
particularly within scientific and intellectual contexts 
(Brown, 2003). Many episodes of scientific creativity are 
driven by analogical comparisons (Dunbar and Blanchette, 
2001), often involving image related analogies (Clement, 
2008). Much progress has been made in cognitive science 
on modeling this analogical reasoning process (see below), 
prompting the following questions. Are we any closer to 
creating an autonomous model of the analogical reasoning 
that can generate new creative analogies? What progress 
has been made towards such a creative analogy model? 
What are the main challenges that lie ahead? 
 In this paper we envisage a creative process that can take 
any given target description and using a pre-stored collec-
tion of domain descriptions, identify potentially creative 
source domains with which to re-interpret the given prob-
lem. This paper explores and evaluates the potential for a 
model of analogy to act as a creativity engine.  
 While Boden (1992) argues that analogy is effectively 
the lowest form of creativity (improbable), we argue that 
analogical creativity should be seen a part of a cohesive 
human reasoning system. If the inferences mandated by an 
analogy contradicts a fundamental belief, especially one 
that has accrued many consequent implications, then re-
solving this contradiction might well involve the “shock 
and amazement” of transformational creativity. As such, it 
appears that analogies may drive creativity at any of 
Boden’s levels of creativity. Our creativity model is do-
main independent and does not include a pragmatic com-
ponent or domain context. So, as our model does not use 
domain-specific knowledge, arguably it cannot be easily 
cast as improbable, exploratory or transformational crea-
tivity (Boden, 1992).  
 The current work was driven by three main aims. Firstly, 
we wished to assess the creative potential of a three-phase 
model of analogy. Secondly, we wished to assess the im-
pact of using differing knowledge bases upon the creative 
potential of our analogy model. Finally, we wished to as-
sess the wider implications of analogical models for com-
putational creativity. Is a three-phase model either neces-
sary or sufficient to function as an engine of creativity? 
Can such a model re-discover analogies considered to be 
creative by people? Since people often overlook analogies 
(Gick and Holyoak, 1980) even when they are present, will 
such a model uncover many creative analogies or are crea-
tive analogies, in some way, different and rare? 
 We see the current model as being potentially useful in 
three distinct ways, but for now we do not commit to using 
it in one particular manner. Firstly, it could be used as a 
simple model of creativity, yielding creative interpretations 
for a presented problem. Secondly, it could be used as a 
tool to assist human creativity; suggesting source domains 
to people, to enable them to re-interpret a given target 
problem. Finally, it could be used as one possible model of 
how people analogize in a creative means. 
 The paper is structured as follows: first we describe the 
Kilaza1 model for generating creative analogies, briefly 
illustrating its operation on the famous atom:solar-system 
                                                 
1 Kilaza is not an acronym.  
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analogy. Then we present results that reflect the model’s 
ability to re-generate some well-known h-creative analo-
gies (Boden, 1992). Finally, the implications of these re-
sults are assessed and some remaining challenges are dis-
cussed.  
Analogy as an Engine of Creativity 
An analogy is a conceptual comparison between two col-
lections of concepts, a source and target (Gentner, 1983), 
such that the source highlights particular aspects of the 
target, possibly suggesting some new inferences about it. 
In creative analogies, an productive source domain con-
jures up a new and revolutionary interpretations of the tar-
get domain, triggering novel inferences that help explain 
some previously incongruous phenomena or that help inte-
grate some seemingly unrelated phenomena (Boden, 1992; 
Eysenck and Keane, 1995). Creative analogies differ from 
“ordinary” analogies primarily in the conceptual “distance” 
between the source and target domains (i.e., these two do-
mains may never have been linked before) and the useful-
ness of the resulting comparison. Both creative and mun-
dane analogies appear to use the same analogical reasoning 
process, as described in the following section, but different 
in their inputs and outputs.  
 Kekulé’s is famous for his analogy between the carbon-
chain and a snake biting its own tail. But this analogy 
could have been triggered by many alternative and more 
mundane source domains – from tying his own shoe-lace 
to buckling his belt. While many source domains could 
have generated the creative carbon-ring structure, Gick and 
Holyoak (1980) have shown most people (including Ke-
kulé) frequently fail to notice many potential analogies. 
This highlights one potential advantage of a computational 
model, in that a model can tirelessly explore all potential 
analogies, returning only the most promising comparisons 
to a user for more detailed consideration. Thus, computa-
tional models could potentially act a tools helping people 
overcome one barrier; namely, their failure to perceive 
analogies when they are present.  
Kilaza Analogical Creativity Engine  
Keane (1994) presented a five-phase model of the analogi-
cal reasoning process, which recognises the distinct phases 
of representation, retrieval, mapping, validation and in-
duction. While other authors describe slightly different 
subdivisions of this process, there is broad agreement on 
these phases. Our computational model encompasses the 
three central phases of analogy (see Figure 1). We high-
light that Walls & Hadamard subdivide creativity into the 
phases of preparation, incubation, illumination and verifi-
cation (Boden, 1992), which is reminiscent of several 
multi-phase models of analogy.  
  The heart of our creativity model is the central map-
ping phase and this borrows heavily from Keane and Bray-
shaw’s (1988) IAM model (see also Keane, Ledgeway & 
Duff, 1994). Our model of the retrieval phase attempts to 
overcome the semantic bias suffered by many previous 
models, improving the diversity of the source domains that 
are returned. It was intended that this diversity might ad-
dress the quality of novelty (Ritchie, 2001) associated with 
creativity, retrieving more “unexpected” and potentially 
creative sources. Finally, our model of the validation phase 
attempts to filter out invalid inferences, addressing the 
quality (Ritchie, 2001) factor associated with computa-
tional creativity.  
 Ritchie (2001) identifies the essential properties of crea-
tivity as being directed, novel and useful. We argue that 
our model is directed in that it focuses on re-interpreting 
some given target domain. Our model addresses the nov-
elty property by its ability to retrieve potentially useful but 
semantically distant, even disconnected, source domains. 
Finally, the useful property is addressed through a valida-
tion process that imposes a quality measure on the infer-
ences that are accepted by the model.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Kilaza is a three-phase model of Analogy 
 
Analogical Retrieval Phase-Model 
Existing models for analogical retrieval suffer from the 
limitations in the range of possible retrievals because their 
they either (i) focus exclusively on domain semantics (like 
MAC/FAC; Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995) or (ii) focus 
primarily on domain semantics (like HRR; Plate, 1998). 
Other models -- such as ARCS (Thagard et al, 1990) and 
Rebuilder (Gomes et al, 2006) - supplement domain repre-
sentations by elaboration from external sources (like 
WordNet) to widen the net to include more semantically 
non-identical sources. However, all of these approaches 
arguably over-constraint retrieval for the the proposes of 
creativity. We argue that a creative retrieval process must 
allow semantically distant and even semantically discon-
nected sources to be retrieved, ideally without overwhelm-
ing the subsequent phase-models with irrelevant domains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Topology is a key characteristic in retrieving creative 
source domains 
 
Gentner (1983) mentions two specific qualities are re-
quired of analogical comparisons: semantic similarity and 
structural similarity. The model presented in this paper 
performs retrieval based exclusively on structural similar-
ity, performing retrieval based exclusively on the graph 
structure (or topology) of each domain description. This 
design decision was taken to overcome the semantic nar-
rowness that constrains existing models, with the hope that 
retrieval mapping validation 
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this would increase the possibility of retrieving surprising 
and creative source domains. As the example in Figure 2 
illustrates, semantics and domain topology are often inter-
twined.  
 Each domain description is mapped onto a location in an 
n-dimensional structure space (Figure 3), where each di-
mension represents a particular topological quality of that 
domain. Structure space is somewhat akin to feature vec-
tors (Yanner and Goel, 2006; Davies, Goel and Yanner, 
2008). Image related analogies are often involved in crea-
tive comparisons (Clement, 2008) and a variety of image-
based analogy models has been developed, focusing on 
specific topics such as; geometric proportional (IQ type) 
analogies (Evans, 1967; Bohan and O’Donoghue, 2000), 
geo-spatial comparisons (O’Donoghue et al, 2006), spatial 
representations of conceptual analogies (Davies et al, 2008; 
Yanner et al, 2008) and reasoning about sketch diagrams 
(Forbus et al, 2011). Our model performs a single retrieval 
process for each presented target, in contrast to the iterative 
retrieval and spreading activation phases employed by 
KDSA to retrieve semantically distant sources (Wolverton 
and Hayes-Roth, 1994).  
 Specific topological features used by our retrieval model 
include quantifying the number of objects and predicates 
(first order and higher order) and number of root predicates 
etc. Thus, the representation in Figure 4 might be mapped 
onto the location (4 0 2 2 0 0 1) in structure space – 4 ob-
ject references, 0 high-order predicates, 2 unique first-
order relations, 2 first-order relations and 2 root predicates 
etc. The distinction between unique and non-unique rela-
tions, for example, distinguishes between domains repeat-
edly using a small number of relations and domains that 
typically have one instance of each relation in its descrip-
tion. One advantage of this scheme is that the distance be-
tween domains is not impacted by the number of domains 
contained in memory so the retrieval system should scale 
reasonably well. For the retrieval results presented later in 
this paper a maximum retrieval distance of 10 is imposed – 
and only candidate source inside this threshold are consid-
ered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Displacing the Locus of Retrieval within a 3D repre-
sentation of n-dimensional Structure Space. Only source domains 
within the displaced boundary are retrieved and passed to the 
remaining phases of analogy.  
 
 Topologically similar (i.e., homomorphic as well as 
isomorphic) domains are mapped onto similar locations 
within this topology-based structure space (O’Donoghue 
and Crean, 2002). To account for the inferences that were 
sought from any inspiring source domain, the locus of re-
trieval was slightly offset to account for this additional 
source domain material. Included in this offset is the desire 
for sources containing additional first-order relations and 
high-order relations. However, this offset has relatively 
little impact on the final results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(heavier nucleus electron) 
(attracts nucleus electron) 
 
Figure 4: Simplified Model of Rutherford’s Problem 
 
Analogical Mapping Phase-Model 
The model for the mapping phase is based on the Incre-
mental Analogy Machine (IAM) model (Keane & Brad-
shaw, 1988; Keane et al, 1994). It consists of the three sub-
processes of root-selection, root-elaboration and inference 
generation. Mapping proceeds as a sequence of root-
selection and root-elaboration activities, gradually building 
up a single inter-domain mapping. Typically a domain de-
scription will consist of a small number of root predicates, 
each controlling a large number of (partly overlapping) 
lower-order predicates. 
Root selection Root selection identifies “root predicates” 
within a representation, which are typically the controlling 
causal relations in that domain. Each root predicate lies at 
the root of a tree of predicates and each root is be seen as 
“controlling” the relations lower down the tree. In our im-
plementation of IAM, the root-selection process examines 
the “order” of each predicate. Objects are defined as order 
zero and first-order relations that connect two objects are 
defined as order one. The order of a causal relation is de-
fined as one plus the maximum order of its arguments. 
Mapping begins with the highest order relations and maps 
any unmapped low-order root-predicates last.  
Root elaboration Root elaboration extends each root-
mapping, placing the corresponding arguments of these 
relations in alignment. If these arguments are themselves 
relations, then their arguments are mapped in turn and so 
on until object arguments are mapped. Items are only 
added to the inter-domain mapping when they conform to 
the 1-to-1 mapping constraint (Gentner, 1983).  
Inference Generation Each analogical comparison is 
passed to the inference generation sub-process. Analogical 
inferences are generated using the standard algorithm for 
pattern completion CWSG – Copy With Substitution and 
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Generation (Holyoak et al, 1994). In effect, additional in-
formation contained in the source domain is carried over to 
the target, creating a more cohesive understanding of that 
target problem.  
Analogical Validation Phase-Model 
The third part of our tri-phase model is focused on analogi-
cal validation. Validation attempts to ensure that the ana-
logical inferences that are produced are correct and useful.  
 O’Donoghue (2007) discusses the accuracy of this vali-
dation process, using human raters to assess the goodness 
of inferences that were rated as either valid or invalid. 
However, this paper did not assess the models ability to 
discover creative analogies. 
 Phineas (Falkenhainer, 1990) is a multi-phase model of 
analogy that incorporates a post-mapping verification 
process. To achieve this Phineas incorporates a model of 
the target domain – qualitative physics simulation - illus-
trating the power of embedding an analogy model within a 
specific problem domain. However, this qualitative-
simulation process effectively limits Phineas to reasoning 
only about physical and physics-related analogies.  
 The validation model presented in this paper is relatively 
simple, aimed at rejecting those predicates that are deemed 
invalid – rather than guaranteeing the validity of those in-
ferences that are accepted. This approach helped maximise 
the creative potential of this model, by resisting the rejec-
tion of potentially plausible inferences. Of course, a more 
complex validation process could make use of problem-
specific domain knowledge (where available). In the ab-
sence of such domain-specific knowledge verification and 
validation of the analogy could be carried using user feed-
back, employing Kilaza in a tool-like way.  
 The validation phase-model is composed to two main 
parts. The first performs validation by comparing the 
newly generated inference to predicates already stored 
somewhere in memory. The second mode of validation is 
more general and driven in part by the functionally rele-
vant attributes that play a role in analogical inference 
(Keane, 1985).  
Validation by Predicate Comparison The validation 
process compares newly inferred predicates (produced by 
CWSG) to the previous contents of memory. Inferences are 
firstly compared to predicates in memory, with both the 
agent and patient roles potentially being validated inde-
pendently. This validation mechanism thus has access to 
the entire contents of memory, accessing predicates from 
any of the domains stored in that memory. This model of 
validation captures the advantages of simplicity and gener-
ality, but it does of course mean that dependencies between 
arguments are not captured. This limitation was deemed 
acceptable within the context of our desire for a creativity 
engine. While many simple inferences were validated by 
this mechanism, many creative inferences were not. This 
may be partly attributed to the relatively small number of 
predicates contained in memory and to the novelty associ-
ated with creative inferences. To address this shortcoming 
validation using functional attributes was introduced.  
Validation with Functional Attributes Functional attrib-
utes specify necessary attribute requirements for each role 
of a predicate – being inspired by the functionally relevant 
attributes of Keane (1985). Functional attributes are intra-
predicate constraints that ensure each predicate appears to 
be a plausible combination of a relation coupled with each 
of its arguments.  
 It should be pointed out that functional attributes have 
only been used with first-order predicates – those whose 
arguments are objects. Although validating higher-order 
(causal) relations might make use of the spatio-temporal 
contiguity associated with causality, but this cannot be 
relied upon (Pazzani, 1991) and is not enforced by our 
model. Thus our model treats all causal inferences as im-
plicitly valid.  
 Functional attribute definitions connect each role of a 
predicate directly into an attribute hierarchy, whereby ar-
guments filling those roles must conform to these attribute 
constraints. Kilaza stores functional attributes for both the 
agent and patient arguments of each relation independ-
ently. More general relations (part-of, next-to) typically 
have few functional attributes, whereas more specific rela-
tions (hit, eat) possess a greater number of attribute restric-
tions. For example the agent role of hit might require the 
hitter to be a physical object, whereas the agent of an eat 
relation might have to be a living organism or an animal. 
Relations that are more specific are seen to be more ame-
nable to the validation process, while their more general 
counterparts are more difficult to validate accurately.  
 In addition, functional attributes have also been used to 
support a form of inference adaptation. This allows an in-
ferred relation to be adapted to a semantically similar rela-
tion that better suits the arguments that pre-existed within 
in the target domain. Adaptation uses the functional attrib-
utes to conduct a local search of the taxonomy, to identify 
a more semantically suitable relation that better fits the 
given arguments.  
Data Sets 
Three datasets were used to conduct experiments using the 
described model. These are referred to as the Professions 
dataset, the Assorted dataset and an Alphanumeric dataset. 
The dataset contained a total of 158 domains and our crea-
tivity engine attempted to find creative source analogues 
for a given number of target problems. It was hoped that 
the differing natures of these collections would provide a 
reasonable grounds on which to evaluate the computational 
model – and to assess its potential to act as a creativity 
engine.  
Professions Dataset consists of descriptions of fourteen 
professions, including accountant, butcher, priest and sci-
entist. These are rather large domain descriptions created 
by Veale (1995) and range in size from 10 to 105 predi-
cates (M=55.4, SD=29.3). One important feature of the 
Professions dataset is its reliance on many different in-
stances of a small number of relational predicates, includ-
ing control, affect, depend, and part. The domains range 
from using just 6 distinct relational predicates (ignoring 
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duplicates) to the most diverse domain that uses 15 
(M=8.9, SD=2.2). Another important feature is that this 
dataset does not appear to use a set of clearly identifiable 
high-order relations (such as a cause, result-in or inhibit) 
between first-order predicates. 
Assorted Dataset consists of a large number of smaller 
and more varied domain descriptions, including many of 
the frequently referenced domains in the analogy literature; 
such as the solar-system, atom, heat-flow and water-flow 
domains. It also includes an assortment of other domains 
describing golf, soccer and story-telling. The 81 domains 
of the Assorted dataset use 108 distinct (ie non-repeated) 
relations. Each of these domains contains between 1 and 15 
predicates (M=4.16, SD = 2.9). The average number of 
distinct relational predicates in each domain is M=3.48, 
indicating that most relational predicates are used just once 
in each of the Assorted domains. 
Alphanumeric Dataset One final dataset contained 62 
semantically constrained domains. However, these do-
mains contained a great deal of topological diversity. It 
was hoped that this mixture of topologies might support 
some novel comparisons and inferences and provided a 
counterpoint to the semantic richness of the other domains.  
Example: p-Creative Re-Discovery of Ruther-
ford’s Analogy  
Before presenting detailed results, we will first see how 
Kilaza can re-discover Rutherford’s famous solar-
system:atom analogy. We highlight that this is a test for the 
p-creativity (Boden 1992) of our model – though not nec-
essarily a model how Ernest Rutherford actually conducted 
his own reasoning.   
 The traditional representation of this analogy (Figure 5) 
is heavily based on a post hoc description of the domains 
involved. These descriptions and are heavily influenced by 
the analogy itself. We shall first look at the traditional rep-
resentation of this domain, before examining how our 
model can also deal with more realistic version of how 
Rutherford might have thought of the target problem be-
fore arriving at his famous comparison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Traditional representation of Rutherford’s Solution  
 
First, the semantically impoverished target problem (Fig-
ure 4) is mapped onto its location in structure space. We 
highlight that the “locus of retrieval” is slightly displaced 
from the targets original location to account for the addi-
tional information that one expects to be found in a useful 
source domain. In this instance the desired source was re-
trieved at a distance of just over 6 “units” in structure 
space. The desired source (the solar-system domain) and 
all other candidate sources near the locus of retrieval were 
passed in turn to the mapping and validation phases of the 
model. 
 In total 10 other candidate source domains that were 
retrieved also generated inferences, most yielding only one 
inference each. Three domains generated more than one 
candidate inference – but all three were different versions 
of the solar-system domain. We point out that our semantic 
“free” retrieval process can also trigger identification of the 
same source, even if it was represented in a number of al-
ternate ways (O’Donoghue, 2007). Our mapping model 
successfully generated the correct inter-domain mapping 
and CWSG generated the desired inferences without adap-
tation.  
Representation Issues in de novo Discovery of 
p-creative analogies  
We argue that the traditional presentation of Rutherford’s 
analogy is a simplified pedagogical device (Figure 5). This 
description of the target problem effectively removes much 
of the complexity of the real discovery task as encountered 
by Rutherford. The description of the target problem uses 
terminology specifically designed to accentuate the seman-
tic (and structural) similarity that is the result of Ruther-
ford’s comparison – and should not be treated as an input 
when re-creating this creative episode.  
 This distinction between the problem domain as it would 
have existed before the creative analogy and its subsequent 
representation after discovering that analogy is a serious 
problem - one that is easily overlooked. Any model that 
attempts to re-discover known creative analogies must ad-
dress the original problem, not just the representation that 
accentuates the desired similarity. Differences in domain 
terminology and topology are central to the distinction 
between elaborating a given analogy, and the much more 
difficult task of generating a novel h-creative (or p-
creative) analogy (Boden, 1992).  
 We argue that generating Rutherford’s analogy using the 
representation in Figure 6 is a far better test of a models 
creative ability, than the normal post hoc representation in 
Figure 5. Terminological differences are particularly 
prevalent in distant between-domains analogies as the first-
order relationships describing the problem domains origi-
nate in different disciplines. When modeling analogical 
creativity, we must expect to encounter these differences in 
terminology, and our models of retrieval, mapping and 
validation must be able to overcome these problems. 
 Ernest Rutherford would most likely have thought of the 
target relation between the nucleus and electron as elec-
tromagnetic-attraction, and not the more generic 
attracts relation. The corresponding relationship be-
tween source’s sun and planet is gravitation. It is only 
after he found the analogy (which involved mapping 
revolves
nucleus electron 
attracts heavier 
and 
cause 
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electromagnetic-attraction with gravita-
tion) that these relationships can be generalized to a 
common super-class like attracts (Gentner, 1983). 
 We point out that our model can operate successfully on 
either the simplified or more realistic domain descriptions. 
This is primarily the result of our retrieval and mapping 
models using domain topology, rather than using 
identicality (or similarity) between the predicates in both 
domains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: More realistic representation of Rutherford’s Analogy 
 
Results of Individual Phase Models 
We shall first briefly examine the performance of the re-
trieval and validation models in isolation, before looking at 
their combined performance in the next section. We shall 
briefly examine the results of the mapping model, but our 
focus will remain on the inferences that it produced. Re-
sults were produced from a memory containing the three 
previously described datasets.  
Retrieval Results Retrieval was performed in structure 
space. The distance between domains in structure space 
varied from 2.645 to 230 (M= 80, SD=57.3), with a large 
number of domains being given a unique structural index 
in this space. A small number of locations contained multi-
ple domains – these mostly involved small domains of just 
a few predicates from the Assorted dataset.  
Retrieval and Mapping A broad tendency was identified 
between structure-based retrieval and the size of the result-
ing inter-domain mapping, although the correlation was 
low. A range effect was identified between structure space 
and the size of the resulting mapping, indicating that larger 
distances between domains in structure space tend to pro-
duce smaller inter-domain mappings. This indicates a weak 
connection between structure-based retrieval and the size 
of any resulting mappings.  
Validation Results Although the validation model was 
very simplistic, it proved surprisingly effective. For exam-
ple with the inferences generated on the Professions data-
set, the average (human) rating awarded to predicates that 
Kilaza categorized as valid was M=2.62 (SD=2.09), while 
the average rating awarded to the invalid predicates was 
M=1.57 (SD=1.23). As ratings were given between 1 and 7 
with 7 representing clearly valid inferences, this indicates 
that many of the generated inferences were of rather poor 
quality.  
Adaptation Results In addition, 24 inferences were passed 
to the adaptation process and 20 of these were adapted. 
While we cannot realistically assess if these adapted infer-
ences matched what was “intended” by our analogy model, 
we did assess the validity of these inferences using two 
human raters.  
 When we look at human ratings for the 20 adapted pred-
icates before and after adaptation, we see that the average 
ratings were increased by the adaptation process - from 
1.57 (SD=1.23) to 2.57 (SD=1.70). The average ratings of 
the adapted predicates was broadly in line with the predi-
cates from Kilaza’s valid category above (M=2.62, 
SD=2.09). Before adaptation, 18 of the 20 (90%) predi-
cates were given rated as invalid and after adaptation just 
12 (60%) were rated as invalid. Thus, adaptation has a dis-
tinct influence on improving the ratings of the rejected 
inferences.  
It may well be argued that this adaptation process is it-
self somewhat creative – identifying new relations that 
better fit the available target arguments. In contrast to the 
top-down nature of the creative analogy approach, predi-
cate adaption is a very much a bottom-up process that is 
motivated by the detection of a potential analogical com-
parison.  
Creativity Test Results 
To assess the creative potential of our model, we assess its 
performance at the p-creative task of re-creating some 
well-known h-creative analogies (Boden, 1992). These 
include some of the famous examples of creative analogi-
cal comparisons including the Rutherford’s solar-
system:atom analogy, the heat-flow:water-flow and the 
tumour:fortress analogies. Our descriptions are based on 
the standard representation of these domains as found in 
the analogy literature.  
Creative Retrieval We now examine the performance of 
our model on the creative retrieval task. We presented our 
model with the target domain of each of 10 creative analo-
gies, together with a memory of 158 source domains. From 
this memory of 158 potential sources, the retrieval model 
selected a number of these domains as candidate sources. 
Only the selected candidate sources were passed to the 
mapping and validation phase-models. Evaluating only the 
selected source domains was necessary in order to avoid an 
exhaustive search through all possible analogical compari-
sons. While computationally feasibly in this instance, an 
exhaustive search would be impractical on a larger collec-
tion of domains.  
 Before looking at the results, we point out that many 
comparisons did not generate a viable inter-domain map-
ping. Furthermore, most analogies did not generate any 
valid inferences. The following results ignore these unpro-
ductive comparisons and we focus only on the productive 
analogies.  
 All of the desired creative sources were among the can-
didate sources that were retrieved by the model. This gives 
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our retrieval model a recall value of 100% on this creative 
retrieval task. While a large number of other candidate 
sources were also retrieved, this was still a pleasantly sur-
prising result. The distance within structure space between 
the target and the creative sources ranged from 3.1 to 7.9, 
suggesting that structure based retrieval was reasonably 
accurate in locating candidate sources. 
 The precision of the retrieval processing is summarised 
in Figure 7. As can be seen, precision was above 0.2 for 
two problems showing that few other sources were located 
near the structural index of those targets. However, preci-
sion was much lower for most problems, indicating that the 
desired source was merely one of a larger number of can-
didate sources that had to be explored.  
 
Figure 7 –Precision of retrieval for 10 Creative Analogies 
 
Creative Inferences Next we summarise the inferences 
that were generated by each of these comparisons (Table 
1). These results implicitly encompass a productive inter-
domain mapping between the target and each candidate 
source in turn. Kilaza generated and validated the correct 
inferences for 9 (70%) of the creative analogies. The cy-
cling:driving analogy correctly generated no inferences.  
 
Target 
Correct 
Inferences  
Validated  
Inferences  
Atom: Solar-System y 4 
Atom-Falkenhainer: Solar-System-
Falkenhainer y 3 
General: Surgeon y 4  
Heat-flow: Water-Flow y 4  
Leadbelly : Caravaggio y 4 
Love-triangle: Triangle-Directed y 0 
Requited-love: Love Triangle y 3  
Fish : Bird y 4  
Vampire : Banker y 3  
Cycling: Driving n 0 
Table 1 – Number of Inferences generated by different analogies 
 
 One of these analogies also required one inference to be 
adapted. The bird:fish analogy generated the inference 
(flies-through fish water), which was correctly 
adapted to (swim fish water).  
Conclusion 
We presented a three-phase model of analogy, adapting it 
to function as a tool for discovering creative analogies. 
This model encompasses the three central phases of anal-
ogy, namely retrieval, mapping and validation. We argue 
that a model encompassing these three core phases of anal-
ogy is the minimum required to be considered a model of 
analogical creativity.  
 Our retrieval model overcomes the semantic bias of pre-
vious retrieval models, helping retrieve new and surprising 
source domains. This helps to improve the novelty of the 
source domains identified by our creativity engine. Our 
model of the post-mapping validation phase attempts to 
filter out any clearly invalid inferences, thereby improving 
the quality of the analogies identified as being creative. We 
note that novelty and quality are two attributes strongly 
associated with creativity (Ritchie, 2001).  
 Our three-phase model of analogy successfully re-
discovered 10 examples of creative analogies, including 
the heat-flow:water-flow and solar-system-atom analogies. 
In doing so, the model retrieved the correct source from a 
large memory of potential sources. It then developed the 
correct mapping and successfully validated (and adapted) 
the resulting inferences. We point out that these analogical 
comparisons, if produced by a human analogizer, would be 
considered creative.  
 Our focus on creative analogies rather that the more 
normal (or pedagogical) analogies had a far-reaching im-
pact on the model. Terminological differences are particu-
larly prevalent in creative between-domains analogies, as 
the first-order relations describing each domain originate in 
different disciplines. When modeling analogical creativity, 
we must expect to encounter these differences and cannot 
rely heavily on the presence of identical relations. Our 
model successfully created Rutherford’s famous solar-
system:atom analogy, even when the target was represent-
ed in a more realistic and challenging from. Our model 
shows that very significant progress has been made to-
wards an autonomous creativity machine, re-discovering 
many creative analogies.  
 We briefly outline three remaining challenges to ana-
logical creativity, beginning with the issue of knowledge 
representation. Our results illustrate a trade-off between the 
specifity and the generality of domain descriptions. Overly 
specific representations make comparisons more difficult 
to discover, but overly general representations appear too 
profligate and can overwhelm the validation (and subse-
quent) processes. Perhaps multiple representations of each 
domain might offer a useful avenue for progress. Multiple 
representations might also help explain why exerts are 
more fluent in their use of analogy within their own do-
mains (Dunbar and Blanchette, 2001). Our model does not 
currently include an explicit re-representation process 
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highlighting “tiered identicality” (Gentner and Kurtz, 
2006). 
 It seems that the greatest challenge to computational 
analogizing might lie with the post-mapping phases. Chal-
lenges include assessing analogical inferences for validity, 
evaluating the significance of an analogy and considering 
the implications of creative comparisons. Surprisingly little 
attention has been given to this phase – partly because of 
its ultimate dependency on the target problem domain. 
Phineas (Falkenhainer, 1990) and also Rebuilder (Gomes 
et al, 2006) showed that integration of the analogy and 
case-based reasoning within the target domain can have 
very positive effects. While tight integration of all target 
domains into an analogy model seems most unlikely, Ki-
laza has show that a generic validation model can play a 
part improving the quality of the inferences that are ac-
cepted.  
 Overall, the results presented in this paper highlight that 
a three-phase model of analogical reasoning can operate 
successfully as a model of analogical creativity. Our results 
highlight the improbability of finding a suitable source 
domain to re-interpret a given target in a creative manner. 
Extending this model will necessitate a tighter integration 
of the analogy process with other facets of intelligence.  
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